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ABSTRACT 
Human error is the subject of research in almost every industry and profession of 
our times. This term is part of our daily language and intuitively understood by 
most people however, it would be premature to assume that everyone's 
understanding of human error is the same. For example, human error is used to 
describe the outcome or consequence of human action, the causal factor of an 
accident, deliberate violations, and the actual action taken by a human being. As a 
result, researchers rarely agree on the either a specific definition or how to prevent 
human error. The purpose of this article is to explore the specific concept of human 
error using Concept Analysis as described by Walker and Avant (1995). The 
concept of human error is examined as currently used in the literature of a variety of 
industries and professions. Defming attributes and examples of model, borderline, 
and contrary cases are described. The antecedents and consequences of human error 
are also discussed and a definition of human error is offered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When words and terms are commonly used to describe a particular 
phenomenon, assumptions may be made by both the authors and their 
audience. Indeed, it is not unusual to find articles that do not even include a 
specific definition of the word or term. The assumption that all parties both 
understand and agree with a specific term may be erroneous. Human error is 
one term that has become part of the common vernacular in aviation yet it 
has a wide variety of meanings within the industry. For example, human 
error is used to describe the outcome or consequence of human action, the 
causal factor of an accident, and as an action itself. 
This lack of a common definition of the term complicates the attempts 
of researchers to identify meaningful approaches to reducing the effect of 
human error within our individual professions. Without a working concept of 
human error, how is it that we can announce that 72% of Navy and Marine 
Corps flight mishaps between 1995 and 1999 were the result of pilot error 
(Erwin, 2000); or that human error in road accidents "was the sole cause in 
57% of all accidents and was a contributing factor in over 90%" (Green & 
Senders, n.d., p.1); or that "medical errors are the eighth leading cause of 
death in the United States" (McFadden, Towell, & Stock, 2004, p.2)? Other 
industries and researchers declare human error to be the cause of anywhere 
from 30% to nearly 100% of accidents. 
Concepts, like words in our language, evolve over time and may have 
more than one accepted definition. This paper therefore, does not purport to 
identify the one true meaning of human error but will offer a definition that 
includes defining attributes of the concept along with a discussion of the 
antecedents and consequences of the concept. The use of model, borderline, 
and contrary cases will illustrate both what human error is and what it is not. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Concept analysis is a research strategy that can be used as an essential 
element of theory development. The analysis involves a formal, linguistic 
exercise that enables a researcher to examine the attributes and 
characteristics of a concept in order to determine which phenomena clarify a 
concept and which do not. Concept analysis is used to clarify overused and 
vague concepts that are part of our vernacular so that those using the term in 
the future start from the same definition. The result of the concept analysis 
process is an operational definition that has, as a minimum, at least some 
construct validity. 
A concept analysis should not be considered as a final, completed 
project because concepts change over time, sometimes quite rapidly. 
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Different researchers may develop slightly different attributes for the same 
concept or the scientific and general knowledge surrounding the concept has 
changed. "Concept analysis encourages communication . . . will make if far 
easier to promote understanding among our colleagues about the phenomena 
being observed" (Walker & Avant, p. 37-38). 
Concept analysis produces additional benefits to future researchers 
dealing with the concept. First, concept analysis helps the investigator in 
understanding the underlying attributes of the concept. Second, concept 
analysis helps to clarify what the concept is, what the concept is similar to, 
and what the concept is not. Finally, concept analysis identifies the 
antecedents and consequences of the concept. Antecedents are those events 
that occur before the concept can occur and consequences are events that 
happen as a result of the occurrence ofthe concept (Walker & Avant, 1995). 
Wilson (1963) developed an eleven-step process for concept analysis. 
This was later streamlined and simplified by Walker and Avant (1995) into 
an eight-step process. The first two steps used by Walker and Avant deal 
with selecting the concept for analysis and determining the purpose of the 
analysis. These are both preparatory steps and are not tied to the actual 
research methodology of concept analysis. The following simplified six-step 
process will be followed: 
1. Identify all uses of the concept that you can discover. 
2. Determine the defining attributes. 
3. Construct a model case. 
4. Develop constructed cases. 
5. Identify antecedents and consequences. 
6. Define empirical referents. 
USES OF THE CONCEPT 
Etymology is the study of word origins and is an important element of a 
concept analysis because it offers clues to the evolution of language. 
Dictionaries, on the other hand, are the repositories of how words are used 
well after they have become part of our vernacular. According to the Online 
Etymology Dictionary (2001), error dates to circa 1300 from the Old French 
word errur from the Latin word errorem, "wandering, straying, mistake," 
and from the Latin errare "to wander." Although error meant to wander or 
stray in most languages, the Irish word for error, dearmad, derived from the 
Irish word, dermat, meaning, "a forgetting." 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 1986) provides the following 
definitions of the word error: 
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1. The action of roaming or wandering; hence a devious or winding 
course, a roving, winding. 2. Chagrin, fury, vexation; a wandering 
of the feelings; extravagance of passion. 3. The action or state of 
erring. 3a. The condition of erring in opinion; the holding of 
mistaken notions or beliefs; an instance of this, a mistaken notion or 
belief; false beliefs collectively. 3b. Something incorrectly done 
through ignorance or inadvertence; a mistake; a flaw, malformation. 
(p. 277-278) 
According to the American Heritage College Dictionary (1997) error is: 
1: an act, an assertion, or a belief that unintentionally deviates from 
what is correct, right, or true. 2: the condition of having incorrect or 
false knowledge 3: the act or an instance of deviating from an 
accepted code of behavior: 4. a mistake. (p. 466) 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 1986) provides the following 
definitions of the word human: 
1. of, belonging to, or characteristic of man. 2. of the nature of man. 
3. belonging or relative to man as distinguished from God or 
superhuman beings. 4. having or showing the qualities or attributes 
proper to or distinctive of man. (p. 1,345) 
The etymology of human dates back to approximately 1250: 
From Middle French humain "of or belonging to man," from Latin 
human us, probably related to homo (genitive, hominis) "man," and 
to humus "earth," on notion of "earthly beings," as opposed to the 
gods (cf. Classical Hebrew, adam "man," from adamah "ground"). 
Cognate with Old Lithuaian zmuo "man, male person. (Online 
Etymology Dictionary, 2001) 
Combining the meanings of the word "human" with the word "error" 
leads to an examination of "human error"-characteristics of human beings 
that involve unintentional deviations from what is correct, right, or true. 
It is common for investigators to identify different types of human error 
in their research (Reason 1990; Strauch 2002; Wiegmann & Shappell 2003; 
McFadden, Towell, & Stock 2004). Synonyms therefore are useful in 
developing the attributes of a concept because they provide clues to what is 
almost the concept but differs in some way from the concept. Webster's New 
World College Dictionary (2001) provides the following synonyms for error: 
Hansen 65 
Error implies deviation from truth, accuracy, correctness, right, etc. 
and is the broadest term in this comparison [an error in judgment, in 
computation, etc]; mistake suggests an error resulting from 
carelessness, inattention, misunderstanding, etc. and does not in 
itself carry a strong implication of criticism [a mistake in reading a 
blueprint]; blunder implies stupidity, dumbness, inefficiency, etc., 
and carries a suggestion of more severe criticism [a tactical blunder 
cost them the war]; a slip is a mistake, usually slight, made 
inadvertently in speaking or writing; a faux pas is a social blunder 
or error in etiquette that causes embarrassment. (p. 483) 
The use of the concept by authors, politicians, and other historical 
figures also provides clues to the characteristics of human error. Probably the 
most familiar quotation, certainly the most cited, is the Latin phrase errare 
est humanum-to err is human. The British philosopher John Locke wrote, 
"All men are liable to error; and most men are, in many points, by passion or 
interest, under temptation to it" (Nidditch, 1979, p. 706). President Thomas 
Jefferson noted "error is to be pitied and pardoned: it is the weakness of 
human nature" (Jefferson, 1950/1775, p. 283). Physician and educator Lewis 
Thomas (1979) wrote that errors are part of the human makeup when he 
noted that humans are coded for error. He considered it an inescapable 
reality that human beings are built to make mistakes. Stephen Casey (1998) 
did not specifically define human error but noted that there are 
incompatibilities between the characteristics of people and the characteristics 
of the technology we use. The difference between success and failures then 
lies in how well we minimize those incompatibilities. 
It is also appropriate to learn how human error is used in the literature of 
various professions. The books and articles dealing with human error are 
obviously too numerous to adequately address all of the diverse opinions 
about the human error but a sampling across several professions is important. 
The following sections will focus on the broad fields of transportation, 
accident investigation, and human factors and then expand into a sampling of 
other professions that deal with human error. 
Transportation 
All modes of transportation deal with human error, particularly as it 
relates to accidents. Human error or pilot error is readily pointed to as the 
cause factor of most aircraft accidents although maintenance errors and Air 
Traffic Control errors also receive attention. The role of human error in 
highway accidents, shipping accidents, train accidents, and pipeline 
accidents is well researched. 
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Humans commit driving errors because humans have three fallible 
mental functions (perception, attention, and memory) that limit the ability to 
processing information. It is the situation that exceeds the limits of human 
mental functions that leads to road accidents. (Green & Senders, n.d.). 
Jim Hall (1995), Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board 
stated that: 
Humans bear the ultimate responsibility for recognizing, 
interpreting, compensating for, and correcting or mitigating the 
consequences of deficiencies, failures, and malfunctions in the 
hardware and software, and ironically in their own performance. 
Because the human retains responsibility for the system, regardless 
of its level of automation, human/machine system failures are often 
reported as human error. (p. 4) 
Senders and Moray (1991) wrote, "error is something that has been done 
which was not intended by the actor, nor desired by a set of rules or an 
external observer, or that let the task or system outside its acceptable limits" 
(p. 25). 
Ahlstrom & Hartman (2001) in their discussion on human error in 
airway facilities, noted that human errors are frequently less associated with 
human characteristics than with error-likely conditions. "People are set up 
for error by the system design" (p. 2). 
Goulielmos and Tzannatos (1997) in a discussion on shipping safety 
noted human errors have become more critical in the man-machine interface 
of the bridge. Typical operator errors may be presented as perceptual-motor 
errors related to skill, procedural errors related to rules, and inadequate 
monitoring errors. 
Accident investigation/prevention 
Sidney Dekker (2002) does not specifically define human error but 
differentiates between an old view of human error as the cause of a mishap 
and a new view of human error as a symptom of externalities acting upon a 
human being in a specific situation. 
Woods, Johannesen, Cook, & Sarter (as cited in Strauch, 2002) define 
human error as: 
A specific variety of human performance that is so clearly and 
significantly substandard and flawed when viewed in retrospect that 
there is no doubt that it should have been viewed by the practitioner 
as substandard at the time the act was committed or omitted. (p. 20-
21) 
Strauch (2002) defines human error as "an action or decision that results 
in one or more unintended negative outcomes" (p. 21). The fundamental 
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attributes of error involve what a human does or intends to do but that leads 
to outcomes that differ from what was intended. 
Petersen ( 1996) argues that "human errors are caused by the situations 
in which people find themselves-a particular situation at a particular 
moment that makes it totally normal and logical to commit an error that may 
result in an accident and an injury" (p. 4 ). 
Departing from the normal emphasis on human error in accidents, 
Hollnagel (2004) generally finds the term human error too simplistic. In a 
pseudo concept analysis, he defines an accident as "a short, sudden, and 
unexpected event or occurrence that results in an unwanted and undesirable 
outcome. The short, sudden, and unexpected event must directly or indirectly 
be the result of human activity ... " (p.S). Hollnagel further comments that 
"an accident can thus refer to either an event, the outcome of an event, or the 
possible cause. This unattractive quality is characteristic of other important 
terms as well, for instance 'human error"' (pp. 4-5). 
Human factors 
One of the most cited definitions of human error is "the failure of 
planned actions to achieve their desired ends-without the intervention of 
some unforeseeable event" (Reason, 1997, p. 71). Reason noted that the 
intervention of an unforeseeable event component of his definition is 
necessary to separate controllable actions from "luck" --either good or bad. 
Reason further identifies specific modes of human error that include slips, 
lapses, mistakes and violations-a common taxonomy for human error 
researchers. 
Cacciabue (2004) considers human error, especially in the management 
of human-machine interactions as "inappropriate performance/behavior, 
dependent on the context and dynamic contingencies and imbedded in a 
specific socio-technical environment" (p. 23). Human errors can involve 
either performance elements (errors of omission or commission) or behavior 
elements (slips, lapses, mistakes, and violations as discussed by James 
Reason). 
Nursing and medicine 
Medicine and aviation have similar problems when it comes to human 
error. Both deal with time critical decisions, both view human error as a 
significant problem, both know that errors can result in the deaths of their 
customers, and both experience significant financial losses directly related to 
human error. One primary difference between the two is that fatal errors in 
aviation frequently result in the death of those who commit the error but this 
is seldom the case for medical practitioners. 
In the medical field, medical errors are generally synonymous with 
human errors. With respect to medical errors, one definition is "the failure of 
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a planned action to be completed as intended (that is, an error of execution) 
or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (that is, an error of planning)" 
(Institute of Medicine, 2000. p. 28). 
In the patient safety movement within the medical field, the reported 
death toll of patients under medical care spurred Congress and other federal 
agencies to take swift and strong action. Unfortunately, much of that effort 
was focused on the human component of medical error. "High error rates are 
predictable whenever human beings provide services via complex delivery 
systems. Human beings routinely make mistakes, even when they exercise 
due care"." (Hyman & Silver 2005, p. 56). 
Attributing problems exclusively to human error may lead investigators 
into shallow and misleading interpretations of the root causes of accidents. 
As with aircraft accidents, the medical profession is quick to identify the 
human error cause associated with adverse events. 
The focus on human error arises from natural laws that capture how 
people make causal judgments, notably hindsight bias. Knowledge 
of outcome biases our judgments about the processes that led to that 
outcome. In looking back, reviewers tend to oversimplify the 
situation the practitioners faced, blocking their ability to see the 
deeper story behind the label "human error." (Billings & Woods, 
2001) 
Minor variations in performing tasks are of little concern in medicine 
because the outcomes are acceptable, however when some limit of 
acceptability is exceeded that variation is considered a human error. "Human 
error is any human action or lack thereof that exceeds the tolerances defined 
by the system with which the human interacts" (p. 28). While human error 
may include both intentional and unintentional acts, intentional malevolent 
behavior is not a human error-it is a deliberate act intended to cause an 
adverse effect. (Rooney, Vanden Heuvel, Lorenzo, Stoecklein, & 
Christensen, 2002) 
Mhyre and McRuer (2000) define human error as a failure to perform an 
action within the tolerance limits necessary for adequate and safe 
performance. Lapses (failures of memory) and mistakes (deficiencies or 
failures in judgment) are included in this definition. 
Based on disciplinary case files from state nursing boards, Woods and 
Doan-Johnson (2002) identify eight categories of nursing errors. These 
categories include system, individual and practice errors. The categories 
identified are: 
1. lack of attentiveness, 2. lack of agency/fiduciary concern, 3. 
inappropriate judgment, 4. medication errors, 5. lack of intervention 
on the patient's behalf, 6. lack of prevention, 7. missed or mistaken 
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physician or health care provider orders, and 8. documentation 
errors. (p. 46) 
Engineering 
Engineers typically view error as the difference between desired and 
actual performance. Human factors engineering is used during the design 
phase to reduce human error by making machines and systems error tolerant. 
Possible human error actions in a man-machine system must be predicted 
during the design stage to permit appropriate measures to be taken on the 
machine design, training of operators, or the organizations. (Kohda, Nojiri, 
& Inoeu, 1997) 
In a discussion on the nature of the engineering design process, 
Sydenham (2004) noted that it is virtually impossible to avoid errors in 
complex projects because "design is a matter of making many assumptions 
in often problematic situations" (p. 121). Slips and lapses are identified as 
the two main sources of error in design. 
In the field of reliability engineering, human error is defined as "the 
failure to perform a task (or the performance of a forbidden action) that 
could lead to the disruption of scheduled operations or damage to property 
and equipment" (Dhillon, 2003, p. 530). The specific types of human error 
identified are design errors, fabrication errors, inspection errors, handling 
errors, maintenance errors, operator errors, and miscellaneous or 
contributory errors (p. 531 ). 
Educational testing 
Random errors differ from human errors in multiple ways. Most 
significantly, human errors do not occur randomly and their presence is not 
known. Human errors tend to be capricious and their consequences are 
unseen and potentially very serious. The two types of human error are active 
(derived from individual mistakes) and latent (arising from poor 
management decisions). While active errors are the most dominant, latent 
errors are problematic and are connected to active errors (Rhoades and 
Madaus, 2003). 
Computer programming 
"At the source of every error which is blamed on the computer you will 
find at least two human errors, including the error of blaming it on the 
computer" (Anonymous). 
Although computer programming does deal with human error, the 
classification of computer errors offers an insight into the types of errors that 
are either produced or that must be corrected. An error may involve a piece 
of incorrectly written program code, or a bug. Syntax errors are 
ungrammatical or nonsensical statements in a computer program. A logic 
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error is a mistake in an algorithm that causes erroneous results or an 
undesired operation. An error may also be an exception, a condition which 
arises during program execution due to an unexpected event. For instance, it 
is an error to attempt to write more files onto a disk that is full. Continuing 
past an unhandled error can cause error avalanche, a condition in which 
errors pile up and behavior becomes more erratic. 
DEFINING ATTRIBUTES 
Defining attributes are those characteristics of the concept that appear 
repeatedly. In simple terms, defining attributes provide guidance in 
determining how to identify the concept from other similar or related 
concepts. "The defining attributes are not immutable" (Walker & Avant, p. 
41). Attributes may change over time or they may change when used outside 
the specific context of the study. 
Based upon the literature reviewed and discussed in this paper, the 
defining attributes of human error are as follows: 
1. An action that is performed by a human being. 
2. The action occurs at the interface between the human and another 
system (human, machine, environment). 
3. The action is voluntary and deliberate. 
4. The action exceeds tolerance limits. 
The action is performed by a human being 
While some people will argue that faulty reasoning is also a human 
error, it is actually a precursor of error. Humans do not have the capacity to 
know all things nor are they capable of processing every piece of 
information available in order to arrive at perfect decisions. The evaluation 
of human error must begin with the action or series of actions performed. 
Although some medical literature refers to a failure to perform an action as 
part of human error, the deliberate decision to do nothing is an action that is 
frequently appropriate under certain circumstances. 
The action occurs at an interface between a human and another system 
A critical attribute of human error is the interaction between a human 
and some other system (whether another human being, a machine, or the 
environment). The SHELL model identifies typical interfaces between one 
human and software, hardware, the environment, and other human beings. 
Human error occurs at one or more of these interaction points. 
The action is voluntary and deliberate 
Actions that are performed involuntarily (e.g., because of force or 
coercion) are not human errors. An action that is not made intentionally is 
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not a human error. Actions that are performed after the mental, physical, or 
physiological capabilities of the human are exceeded are also not human 
errors. This is important because it separates human error from human 
limitations. Aviation is filled with examples in which a pilot was unable to 
process all of the audio, visual, sensory, and other inputs of a given situation 
and crashed the airplane. Although these accidents are normally classified as 
pilot error accidents, they deal more specifically with internal limitations of 
all human beings. 
The action exceeds tolerance limits 
Tolerances are defined by the system with which the human is 
interacting. A pilot who lands an aircraft with a 20-knot crosswind has not 
committed an error if the aircraft has a defined crosswind landing tolerance 
of 30 knots. Human error may also be defined within social, legal, or 
professional tolerances. Acceptable tolerances will vary widely depending 
on the system and the circumstances. Tolerances in the nuclear power 
industry differ from those of commercial aviation, which also differ from 
those of highway driving. 
CASES 
Cases are used in a concept analysis to provide examples of what the 
concept is, what it is not, and what it is similar to. The model case provides a 
real example that is absolutely an instance of the concept. All components of 
the defining attributes will be present in the model case. 
Borderline cases provide additional insight into the concept by 
presenting examples that contain some of the defining attributes but not all 
of them. Borderline cases help us to understand the difference between the 
defined concept and something close, but not quite the concept. 
Contrary cases are used to delineate boundaries of the concept. A 
contrary case is an example of what is clearly not the concept. Contrary 
cases are helpful because "we often find it easier to say what something is 
not than what it is" (Walker & Avant, p. 44). 
MODEL CASE 
A model case of human error is the Jessica Dubroff aircraft accident in 
April 1996. Jessica was a seven year-old uncertificated student pilot 
attempting to set a new record as the youngest pilot to fly an airplane across 
the United States. Accompanying Jessica were her father (a non-pilot) and 
her flight instructor. Jessica was an instant celebrity with media coverage 
from ABC, CNN and others. Shortly after takeoff from Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, the aircraft crashed approximately 4000 feet north of the runway, 
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killing all three people. The aircraft investigation revealed that the aircraft 
was 96 pounds over the allowable gross weight and the density altitude at 
Cheyenne was higher than the instructor pilot was accustomed to. The 
weather at the time of the takeoff was deteriorating with heavy rain, gusty 
winds, and air turbulence. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the 
probable cause ofthe accident was: 
Analysis 
The pilot in command's improper decision to takeoff into 
deteriorating weather conditions (including turbulence, gusty winds, 
and an advancing thunderstorm and associated precipitation) when 
the airplane was overweight and when the density altitude was 
higher than he was accustomed to, resulting in an a stall caused by 
failure to maintain airspeed. (NTSB, p. 53) 
This accident meets all of the defining characteristics of human error. 
The pilot took an action (attempting to take oft) that was both voluntary and 
deliberate. Although there were pressures to keep to a rigid schedule, the 
pilot had the option to delay the flight. The pilot also had a duty to compute 
the weight and balance on the aircraft and the performance characteristics of 
the aircraft for the conditions present at the airport. The action occurred at 
the interface between a human and a system (the aircraft) and the action was 
outside of established tolerances. In this case, the aircraft was overweight 
and the combination of high-density altitude, gusty winds, turbulence, and 
heavy rain left no margin for safety. This accident provides a pure example 
of human error in transportation. 
CONSTRUCTED CASES 
Borderline case 
The worst aircraft accident in the history of commercial aviatiOn 
occurred March 27, 1977, at Tenerife in the Canary Islands when two 
Boeing 747 aircraft collided on a fog-enshrouded runway (Bruggink, 2000). 
The KLM aircraft was cleared to taxi down the runway and perform a 180-
degree turn in preparation for takeoff. The Pan Am aircraft was cleared to 
follow the KLM aircraft down the same runway but was told to taxi clear of 
the active runway at the third taxiway. The Pan Am aircraft did not clear the 
runway at the assigned taxiway and was still on the runway when the KLM 
captain commenced takeoff without clearance. The ensuing collision on the 
runway killed 583 people. Because of the fog at the airport, the two aircraft 
did not see each other until it was too late to avoid the accident. 
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Analysis 
While it might be assumed the pilot of the Pan Am aircraft committed a 
human error that led to this accident, the circumstances do not match all of 
the criteria identified in the critical attributes. The pilot did taxi down the 
active runway but he did so under the direction of the tower controller. The 
pilot obviously was taking action at the interface of himself and his aircraft. 
There is no evidence from the pilot of the Pan Am (who survived the 
accident) or from cockpit and tower voice recordings that the Pan Am crew 
ever saw the third taxiway. Many factors could explain why the crew might 
have missed the taxiway including unfamiliarity with the airport, the fog, 
and the height of the cockpit. The circumstances involving the Pan Am 
aircraft and its crew do not support a conclusion that they deliberately and 
voluntarily violated their taxi instructions. 
The action of the Pan Am pilot might be considered a mistake because 
the action was inadvertent but not a human error. Both mistakes and human 
error involve actions committed by humans and occur at the boundary 
between a human and another system. The two terms differ significantly 
because mistakes do not imply voluntary and deliberate action even if the 
action actually exceeds acceptable tolerance levels of a system. 
CONTRARY CASE 
Before setting off on a cross-country flight, the pilot obtains a detailed 
weather briefing for the proposed route of flight. Based on this information, 
the pilot decides to delay the flight until the weather improves. 
Analysis 
A contrary case is a clear example of an instance that is not the concept. 
The pilot in this scenario demonstrated sound judgment and a concern for 
safety. The defining attributes of human error are not present in this case. 
ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
According to Walker and Avant (1995), "antecedents are those events or 
incidents that must occur prior to the occurrence of the concept" (p. 45). The 
antecedent for human error is a cognitive ability to distinguish between 
courses of action based upon external inputs. If a person is unable to process 
available inputs and make some sort of decision on what action is or is not 
needed, it cannot be human error. 
Another antecedent for human error is experience and prior knowledge. 
Transportation professionals (pilots, ship captains, truck drivers, etc.) 
develop their skills through education, practice, and experience. Drawing 
upon this know ledge and experience permits the human interacting with a 
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system to reduce those situations that could exceed the tolerance limits of the 
system. 
Consequences are, "those events or incidents that occur as a result of the 
occurrence of the concept" (Walker & Avant, 1995, p. 45). The 
consequences of human error include events or outcomes that are unintended 
and undesired. Unintended but desirable outcomes are not uncommon for 
humans and form the basis of those "unexpected pleasures in life" that we 
enjoy. An action that produces an intended but undesired consequence 
likewise should not be considered a human error. These actions may be 
noble, malicious, desperate, or criminal but not human errors. The soldier 
who throws himself on an enemy hand grenade to save his comrades 
commits a deliberate act with an intended but undesired consequence did not 
commit an error. 
Another consequence of human error could be harm or loss. Although 
death, injury, or some other form of loss is not a consequence of all human 
errors, they are frequently used as a metric to determine that a human error 
has occurred. A consequence of human error can also include no harm or 
loss. A pilot who nearly lands his aircraft with the landing gear retracted but 
is warned by the tower at the last moment and executes a successful go-
around commits a human error but does not suffer a loss. 
EMPIRICAL REFERENTS 
The final step in a concept analysis is to define the empirical referents of 
the concept. Empirical referents are "classes or categories of actual 
phenomena that by their existence or presence demonstrate the occurrence of 
the concept itself' (Walker & Avant, 1995, p. 46). In many cases, the 
empirical referents are the same as the defining attributes of the concept. No 
unique empirical referents for human error have been identified in this paper. 
Human error is identified retrospectively through a largely subjective 
process conducted by other humans familiar with the specific system with 
which the human interacted. The subjective nature of this identification has 
made human error research difficult at best. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of analyzing the concept of human error, a new definition is 
offered. Human error is a voluntary and deliberate action by a human 
interacting with another system that exceeds established tolerances defined 
by that system. The consequences of human error encompass a continuum 
that runs from no injury or loss to major damage and casualties. The action 
taken by the human involves the cognitive ability to decide between alternate 
courses of action based upon experience, know ledge, and the combined 
external and internal inputs available to the human. The ability of humans to 
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decide which of the numerous inputs are significant in choosing the correct 
action to take is important in understanding why we have human error. 
Bounded rationality and satisficing describe the problem of decision-making 
but do not help to reduce human error. 
Human error is a term that is overused and over-emphasized. The 
inclusion of slips, lapses, violations, and blunders into previous definitions 
of human error provide interesting glimpses into the dynamics of human 
involvement in accidents but also unnecessarily overstate the true dimension 
of human error. Human error and human limitations both play a role in 
aviation accidents but should not be treated as the same phenomenon. 
Developing a narrower definition of human error may allow future 
researchers to develop specific strategies to reduce the impact of true human 
error in accidents. 
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